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Introduction 
 
India uses single member plurality system (SMPS) to elect the members of the lower 
house of its national parliament and the state assemblies. Under SMPS, elections 
are conducted for separate geographical areas, known as constituencies or districts, 
and the electors cast one vote each for a candidate with the winner being the 
candidate who gets the plurality of votes.1 SMPS is traditionally defended primarily 
on the grounds of simplicity and its tendency to produce winning candidates, which 
promotes a link between constituents and their representatives. It tends to provide a 
clear-cut choice for voters between two main parties, and is expected to gives rise to 
single-party rather than coalition governments. It also has the benefit of excluding 
extremist parties from gaining representation, unless their support is geographically 
concentrated.  
 
However, SMPS has been criticised because it can lead to a substantial 
disproportionality between the share of the votes cast for each party and its share of 
seats. According to Lijphart (1994), majoritarian electoral systems such as SMPS 
make it difficult for small parties to gain representation because they need to win 
majorities or pluralities of the vote in electoral districts; and tend to systematically 
favour the larger parties, produce disproportional election outcomes, and discourage 
multipartism. Shugart (2008:8) points out that ‘Despite its long historical pedigree 
and its continuing widespread use, it is a system that academic specialists in 
electoral systems rate as one of the least desirable systems (Bowler and Farrell, 
2006), and it also does not fare well in competition with other electoral systems when 
                                                          
1 SMPS is also known as First-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system.  
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new democracies are choosing their method of electing representatives.’ SMPS can 
also exclude minorities from fair representation, and encourage the development of 
parties based on clan, ethnicity or region. Further, it leaves a large number of wasted 
votes, which do not count towards the election of the winning candidate in a 
constituency.   
 
SMPS was adopted, and has remained stable, in India since the country held its first 
democratic election in 1952. SMPS usually works best when the two largest parties 
share most of the votes across different regions of a country. However, since 1989, 
Indian party system has fragmented, and in the seven national elections held during 
the period 1989 to 2009, SMPS failed to produce a single party majority government 
at the centre, leading to a phase of large, and in most part, unstable coalition 
governments. Although the most recent national election held in 2014 produced a 
majority for one party – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), it does not mark a clear 
reversal of coalition politics or governments in India (Diwakar, 2014:124). The 
efficacy of the SMPS in India has not been seriously or sufficiently debated either in 
academic studies or in a policy context. Most prominent comparative studies on 
electoral system reform also exclude India from their analysis (for example Blais, 
2008).   
 
This paper seeks to address the question about the suitability of SMPS during an era 
of party fragmentation and coalition politics in India. Drawing on a comprehensive 
data set covering all sixteen national elections held during 1952-2014, and some 
recent state elections held during 2015-2017, it evaluates how SMPS has performed 
3 
 
against its stated benefits. Based on this evaluation, the paper discusses whether 
there is a case for electoral system reform, and highlights the reasons for the 
continuance of SMPS in India despite its many shortcomings.  
 
Choosing an electoral system 
 
By converting votes cast by the electorate into seats, an electoral system effectively 
determines which candidates are elected, and which party gains power. As Idea 
(2005:1) points out, the electoral system ‘has a profound effect on the future political 
life of the country concerned, and electoral systems, once chosen, often remain fairly 
constant as political interests solidify around and respond to the incentives presented 
by them.’ According to Lijphart (1994:57), the two main political consequences of 
electoral systems include their effects on the proportionality (between share of votes 
and seats) or disproportionality of the electoral outcomes, and their effects on the 
party system, particularly the degree of multipartism and the tendency to generate 
majority victories.   
 
The main objective of the electoral system is to provide representation to the 
electorate. The electoral system should also facilitate formation of a stable 
government, which is able to enact legislation efficiently, and enable voters to hold 
the government accountable either by altering the coalition of parties in power or by 
throwing out of office a single-party, which has failed to deliver (Idea, 2015: 12). The 
nature and the size of party system, as well as the internal cohesion and discipline of 
parties are also influenced by the type of electoral system chosen. If an electoral 
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system is not considered fair, and provides limited opportunities for the opposition to  
win, it can lead to political unrest, and even extremism, where parties or social 
groups decide to work outside the system, using non-democratic means.  
 
Designing an electoral system involves making a choice between two main trade-
offs: between the representativeness of the legislature and government 
accountability; and the accountability of individual politicians and party cohesion (Hix 
et al, 2010).  One view is that elections should produce a representative parliament, 
where party vote-share translates directly into party seat-shares. According to this 
view, elections are best held under some form of proportional representation (PR). 
On the other hand, there is a contrasting view that favours electoral systems such as 
the SMPS that deliver accountable single-party government and facilitate giving a 
majority to whichever party comes first in seats. It is difficult to achieve both these 
objectives through a single electoral system. Similarly, it is difficult for the electoral 
system to produce both accountable politicians as well as cohesive parties, which 
are able to deliver on their electoral promises.  
 
Shugart (2008:54) states that a paradox of reform in parliamentary SMPS is that it 
must be initiated by the very party that was advantaged by the existing system — the 
party with the most seats in parliament. And therefore, the likelihood of electoral 
system reform being implemented is relatively low. Hix et al (2010) remind us that 
there is no such thing as a perfect electoral system, since features, which are virtues 
to some observers could be viewed as defects by others. Choosing an electoral 
system is ultimately a political decision, and the consideration of electoral benefits is 
always an important, if not the only factor in the choice of electoral systems.   
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Why did India choose SMPS? 
 
India’s parliamentary form of government and SMPS are a legacy of British 
colonialism, which ended with India’s independence in 1947. The British introduced 
self-government to India in stages, and it was not until the end of colonial rule in 
1947, and adoption of the Indian Constitution in 1949 by a Constituent Assembly that 
universal suffrage was achieved.2 3 India’s choice of electoral system was influenced 
by the twin pressure of continuing with the SMPS with which it had some experience 
during the British rule, as well as the pressure towards PR to ensure adequate 
representation of its highly heterogeneous population. For a new country that was 
experimenting with democracy despite high levels of illiteracy, three themes of 
SMPS – simplicity, stability and constituency representation (Farrell, 2001:20) were 
instrumental in the decision to adopt this electoral system.4 In the first two national 
elections ie 1952 and 1957, there were also about 90 (of 400) multimember districts 
but these were abolished thereafter. After this change, the electoral system for Lok 
Sabha has remained unchanged.  
 
According to Austin (1966:144), the Constituent Assembly had one predominant aim 
when framing the Indian Constitution ie to create a basis for the social and political 
unity of the country, and it chose to do so by having universal adult suffrage, and 
                                                          
2 The Constitution of India came into force on 26 January 1950. 
3 Under the Indian Constitution, at the central government level, voters elect a 543-member Lok 
Sabha, or the lower house, the principal legislative body from single-member districts using a plurality 
vote. The upper house of the Parliament, the Rajya Sabha or Council of States is indirectly elected by 
members of the state legislative assemblies in accordance with proportional representation system by 
means of a single transferable vote (STV). Members of the state legislative assemblies are also 
elected using SMPS.  
4 India also introduced a system of electoral reservation for socially disadvantaged groups - the 
scheduled castes (SCs) and scheduled tribes (STs), a system that continues till today.  
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providing for the direct representation of the voters in popular assemblies.5 It 
favoured the idea of a ‘loyal opposition’ and two strong parties to ensure the 
traditional working of parliamentary democracy and a cabinet government (Austin, 
1966:146). Although several members of the Constitute Assembly argued for PR, 
this proposal was never taken very seriously, and in India, where the number of 
competing interest groups was large, the Constituent Assembly felt that it made 
more sense to follow the British (SMPS) model (Guha, 2002:108).   
 
An important point to note that an explicit debate on the merits of alternative electoral 
systems did not take place in the Constituent Assembly. Further, whatever limited 
debate that took place did not reveal a deep understanding of the dynamics of either 
the SMPS or of various PR formulae. Instead, there was almost a natural affinity 
towards the familiar SMPS (Sridharan, 2005:355).  
 
How has SMPS performed in India?  
 
In this section, I use data from sixteen parliamentary and few recent state assembly 
elections held during 1952-2017 in India to examine how SMPS has performed 
against its potential benefits. In particular, I study whether and to what extent SMPS 
has led to two party competition at the district level in the past, and its past and likely 
future success in producing stable single-party governments at the national level.  
 
                                                          
5 Popular assemblies refer to Lok Sabha at the centre and Vidhan Sabha in the states.  
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District level trends 
 
In what became known as ‘Duverger’s Law’, Duverger (1959) stated that the simple 
majority electoral system favours the two party system. Two principal reasons for this 
phenomenon relate to the mechanical and the psychological effects. According to 
the mechanical effect, plurality systems tend to have a constraining effect on the 
number of parties, while proportional systems tend to be more ‘permissive’ resulting 
in a greater diversity of parties. The psychological impact of electoral systems 
reinforces this mechanical effect: under SMPS, many voters may not express their 
sincere choice but rather vote strategically for another candidate who they believe 
has a realistic chance of winning the seat.  
 
However, contrary to expectation, SMPS has not unequivocally produced a two party 
system in India at the district level, and a non-trivial proportion of votes have been 
cast in favour of smaller parties, which do not make a difference to the election 
outcome, and are therefore wasted. Figure 1 shows how ‘Effective number of parties’ 
(ENP) by votes, a key measure of party fragmentation, at the district level has 
evolved over 16 national elections in India.6 It shows that in general, the distribution 
of ENP has shifted towards right especially after 1989, showing the increasing 
fragmentation of the Indian party system. This is further evidenced by Table 1, which 
shows that in the latest election in 2014, 95% of the districts had ENP greater than 2, 
and 63% of districts had ENP >2.5. Since 1989, there has been a clear departure 
from predictions of Duverger’s law in most of the Indian districts, with 95% of districts 
having >2 ENP and 32% districts having 3 ENP, thus signalling the inability of the 
                                                          
6 ENP = 1/[Ʃpi2], where p represents vote or seat share of the ith party (Laakso and Taagepera, 
1979). 
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electoral system to stop more parties contesting elections and winning significant 
percentage of votes, many of which are wasted. There must be reasons other than 
pure rational choice (which predicts that voters act strategically and do not tend to 
waste their votes), for example seeking better representation, which could explain 
voters’ support for parties that are unlikely to win an electoral contest.  
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Figure 1 Evolution of the distribution of ENP by votes at district level in Indian national elections 
 
Note: The Y axis measures kernel density, which is a non-parametric way to estimate the probability density function of a random variable. 
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Table 1  ENP by votes at district level in the Indian national elections 
Year Less than or 
equal to 2 
(%) 
 
2 – 2.5 
 
   (%) 
2.5 – 3 
 
   (%) 
> 3 
 
(%) 
Mean Median Number of 
districts 
1952 19% 22% 30% 29% 2.7 2.7 310 
1957 41% 23% 20% 15% 2.4 2.3 312 
1962 18% 23% 30% 29% 2.8 2.7 494 
1967 15% 24% 25% 36% 2.9 2.7 520 
1971 28% 36% 19% 17% 2.4 2.2 518 
1977 51% 40% 8% 2% 2.1 2.0 542 
1980 9% 40% 23% 28% 2.7 2.6 529 
1984 18% 50% 17% 15% 2.4 2.2 542 
1989 13% 50% 18% 19% 2.5 2.3 529 
1991 7% 37% 25% 31% 2.9        2.6 537 
1996 1% 29% 27% 43% 3.0 2.9 543 
1998 3% 40% 29% 27% 2.7 2.6 543 
1999 6% 48% 22% 24% 2.6 2.4 543 
2004 4% 45% 21% 30% 2.8 2.5 543 
2009 2% 33% 22% 43% 3.1 2.9 543 
2014 5% 32% 27% 36% 2.8 2.8 543 
All elections 14% 37% 23% 27% 2.7 2.5 8091 
1952-1984 24% 34% 21% 21% 2.5 2.3 3767 
1989 - 2014  5% 39% 24% 32% 2.8 2.6 4324 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Election Commission of India data. 
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In addition to ENP at district level remaining above 2, the vote share of the winning 
party has also seen a decline as is shown in Figure 2.  The average vote share of the 
winning party in a district averaged 53% for the elections held during 1952-1989, but it 
declined to 47% for subsequent elections, implying a relatively large proportion of 
wasted votes in an election at district level. 
Figure  2 Average vote share of winning party in a district  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Election Commission of India data.  
Notes  (1): Data is from over 8000 constituency level (national) elections during 1952-2014.  
(2): Each point is average for a national election at the district level. 
 
Table 2 shows the frequency distribution of vote share of the winning candidate in 
constituency elections held during 1952-2014. It shows that during 1952-1984, the 
winning candidates in over 60% of the districts received 50% or more votes, but 
thereafter, only 40% of winning candidates managed to secure a majority of votes in a 
district level contest. Thus, despite SMPS, the trend is of declining support for the 
winning party in a district.  
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Table 2 Distribution of vote share of winning candidate in a district 
 
1952-1984 1989-2014 1952-2014 
   
Vote share of 
winning party  
Number of 
districts 
% of 
districts 
Number of 
districts 
% of 
districts 
Number of 
districts 
% of 
districts 
       
<20% 2 0.1% 1 0.0% 3 0.0% 
20-30% 48 1.3% 96 2.2% 144 1.8% 
30-40% 376 10.0% 769 17.8% 1145 14.2% 
40-50% 978 26.0% 1730 40.0% 2708 33.5% 
>50% 2363 62.7% 1728 40.0% 4091 50.6% 
Total 3767 100.0% 4324 100.0% 8091 100.0% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Election Commission of India data.  
 
The same point is also made by observing the trends of the proportion of districts with 
vote share greater than 50% in each national election, which is shown in Figure 3. After 
1991, only around 30-40% of total districts in India saw winning candidate getting a 
majority of votes, which calls into question whether the constituency link and 
representation of constituents is being effectively served under SMPS in India. 
 
Figure 3 Percentage of districts with vote share > 50% of the winning candidate 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Election Commission of India data. 
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Thus, the SMPS has not unequivocally led to a two party system in India at the district 
level, and the threshold to win the election has also seen a decline. Low thresholds 
often lead to multiparty competition, and compound the problems of wasted votes 
usually seen under SMPS. For example, it has been shown by Chhibber and Nooruddin 
(2004) that Indian states witnessing multiparty competition are more likely to involve 
‘vote bank’ politics in favour of specific electoral constituencies rather than provide 
public goods that benefits the broader population.  Further, while allocating public goods 
and services, governments are more likely to favour areas that either return MPs from 
their party or could do after the next election.  
 
Various explanations have been put forward regarding SMPS not unequivocally 
delivering the expected two-party system at the constituency level in India. These 
include Cox’s (1994) non-Duvergerian equilibrium where the first and second placed 
losers tie in a constituency (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004:38). Other studies (Diwakar, 
2007) have however questioned the usefulness of Cox’s SF ratio (vote share of second 
loser to that of the first loser) in explaining deviations from Duverger’s law in the Indian 
situation. It has also been argued that a relatively high level of social heterogeneity is 
the main reason for competition between many parties in the Indian constituencies. As 
Mayer (2013:191,199) argues ‘the Indian experience forces us to recognise the 
profound impact that social divisions and social change have on political competition 
and on the number of parties and candidates who contest elections….social forces 
appear to be so powerful that they must lead us to question whether the mechanical 
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and psychological forces which are at the heart of the [Duverger’s] law are really 
decisive at all.’  
 
National level trends 
 
At the national level, SMPS is expected to deliver a two party system, where one party 
gets a majority in the parliament, and the other acts as a significant and effective 
opposition. Secondly, it is expected that the party with highest number of votes should 
get highest number of seats. However, in India, the level of the top two parties’ vote 
share at the national level has only been around 50 per cent in the recent elections (see 
Figure 4). The balance 50 per cent of vote share is shared mainly by state or regional 
parties that have concentrated support base in their respective states or regions.  
Figure 4 National vote share (%) of top two versus that of other parties   
 
Source: Election Commission of India data. 
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The growing importance of the state and regional parties has been at the cost of the two 
main national parties – the Congress and the BJP.7 Table 3 shows that the percentage 
of districts where these two parties were the top two parties by vote share averaged 
only about 31% during 1989 – 2014.8 In the remaining 69% of districts, the competition 
was either between one of the national parties and a regional party, or between two 
regional parties or state parties. This shows that the top two parties are not likely to win 
enough votes and seats to command an overall majority in the national parliament. This 
has necessitated these parties entering into electoral alliances with state or regional 
parties to improve their chances of forming governments at the centre.  
 
Table 3 Districts where top two parties (by votes) are the Congress and the BJP 
Election 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014 
Average 
1989-2014 
         
 
Percentage of districts where 
Congress and BJP were top two 
parties by vote share   
19.7 29.6 26.2 31.8 36.8 34.1 31.8 34.8 30.6 
 
 
         
Source: Author’s calculations based on Election Commission of India data. 
 
As can be seen in Table 4, until 1984, the top two parties (by seats) routinely secured 
70-75% of seats in the parliament.9 However, in the eight elections after 1989, parties 
other than the top two have routinely won over 200 seats (average of 221 or 41% of the 
                                                          
7 Congress was established in 1885, and led the freedom struggle against the colonial British role. It 
remained the dominant political party for two decades after India’s independence, but its dominance 
declined thereafter. BJP was formed in 1980 and is a Hindu nationalist party. After achieving a clear 
majority in the 2014 national election, it is now seen the principal national party in India.  
8 1989 marked the beginning of fragmentation of the Indian party system.  
9 Until 1984 (except in 1977), substantial share of the seats won by the top two parties went to the 
Congress.  
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total seats) in the Lok Sabha, and this has important implications for the size and 
competitiveness of the party system at the national level. 
 
Table  4 Seats won in Lok Sabha 
   Largest party (by seats) Runner up party (by seats) Other Parties 
Election Seats % Seats Seats Seats % 
1952 364 74% 16 3% 109 22% 
1957 371 75% 27 5% 96 19% 
1962 361 73% 29 6% 104 21% 
1967 283 54% 44 8% 193 37% 
1971 352 68% 25 5% 141 27% 
1977 295 54% 154 28% 93 17% 
1980 353 67% 41 8% 135 26% 
1984 404 79% 30 6% 80 16% 
1989 197 37% 143 27% 189 36% 
1991 232 45% 120 23% 169 32% 
1996 161 30% 140 26% 242 45% 
1998 182 34% 141 26% 220 41% 
1999 182 34% 114 21% 247 45% 
2004 145 27% 138 25% 260 48% 
2009 206 38% 116 21% 221 41% 
2014 282 52% 44 8% 217 40% 
Average '1952-1984 348 68% 46 9% 119 23% 
Average 1989 - 2014 198 37% 120 22% 221 41% 
Average 1952 - 2014 273 52% 83 15% 170 32% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Election Commission of India data. 
 
The fragmentation of the Indian party system is also reflected in the increase in the 
number of parties that have been able to win seats in Lok Sabha. Table 5 shows that 
before the 1989 election, on an average, there were 12 parties with less than 5 seats 
represented in Lok Sabha, but this number increased to 20 in elections held during 
1989-2014. Similarly, while there were on an average, 19 parties that were represented 
in Lok Sabha in elections held between 1989 and 1984, this number increased to 33 in 
the subsequent elections. This matters since ‘the greater the number of parties in the 
legislature, and the higher the presence of extreme ideological parties, the greater the 
difficulty of forming durable coalition’ (Ruparelia, 2015:24).  
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Table 5 Number of parties represented in Lok Sabha  
Year Parties with 
 < 5 seats 
Number of seat winning 
parties 
1952 16 23 
1957 8 12 
1962 13 20 
1967 10 19 
1971 16 24 
1977 11 19 
1980 10 17 
1984 11 17 
1989 17 24 
1991 15 24 
1996 13 28 
1998 22 39 
1999 22 38 
2004 21 38 
2009 25 37 
2014 22 38 
1952-1984 average 12 19 
1989 - 2014 average  20 33 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Election Commission of India data. 
 
The fragmentation of the party system at the national level can also be seen in the 
trends of ENP by votes and seats. Figure 5 shows that even before the fragmentation of 
the party system in 1989, ENP (by votes) remained between 4 and 5 for most elections, 
while ENP by seats averaged around 2 largely because of the domination of the 
Congress in the first two decades after India’s independence. However, after 1989, ENP 
(by votes) has averaged above 6, and even ENP by seats has averaged around 5. The 
2014 election was an exceptional one, which saw a rare majority for a single party 
leading to a decline in ENP by seats to 3.5. However, as MacDonald and Moussavi 
(2015a: 18) point out ‘The BJP’s landslide victory [in 2014] was in fact due to the 
idiosyncrasies of India’s first-past-the-post electoral system. While not unique in the 
country’s history, the scale of the BJP’s seat bonus in 2014 returns India to “minoritarian 
as opposed to majoritarian democracy, in which democratic outcomes are perverted by 
disproportionately empowering the ruling party.’ 
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Figure 5 Effective number of parties (by votes and seats) at the national level 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Election Commission of India data. 
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government. If any of these electoral outcomes occur at a regular interval, SMPS 
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outcomes in Indian national elections. In 3 elections - 1996, 1998 and 1999, Congress 
received highest share of shares but was second to BJP in respect of number of seats. 
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although hung parliaments, minority governments and power-sharing executives arise in 
other plurality-rule regimes, yet they rarely become the norm.  
 
According to Sridharan (2014:55), under plurality-rule, unlike in PR, a small vote swing 
can hugely increase or decimate a party. And this tends to encourage minority coalitions 
because greater electoral volatility creates the possibility for an opposition party coming 
into power in the next election either on its own or in a coalition. Similarly, Ruparelia 
(2015:27) has argued that ‘The demise of single-party majority governments [in India] at 
the Centre since 1989 owes much to the complex interaction effects of plurality-rule 
elections in a progressively regionalized federal parliamentary democracy.’ Sridharan 
(2014:56-7) notes that three India-specific features incentivise the formation of either a 
minority government and/or large and ideologically indiscriminate coalitions. First, in the 
event of a hung parliament, the government does not need to demonstrate a majority 
but only needs to prove that the majority does not oppose them. Second, both national 
and regional parties have strong incentives to form pre-electoral coalitions, ignoring 
lesser ideological differenes, facilitating the formation of large and ideologically diverse 
coalitions. Lastly, there is a ‘lock-in’ effect arising out of mutual inter-dependencies 
amongst parties in national and state elections.  
 
Although the most recent 2014 election saw a single party majority, it also resulted in 
another SMPS anomaly in respect of decimation of the opposition. In summary, judged 
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on various criteria, Indian elections have regularly produced results at the national level, 
which are not expected in SMPS.  
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Table 6  ‘Anomalous’ results and the evolution of party system at national level10  
Election 
Seat Share Vote Share Government formed by 
Year Largest party Runner-up party 
Top two 
parties Largest party Runner-up party 
Top two 
parties 
 1952 0.74 Congress 0.03 CPIb 0.77 0.45 Congress 0.11 SP 0.56 Congress 
1957 0.75 Congress 0.05 CPIb 0.80 0.48 Congress 0.10 PSP 0.58 Congress 
1962 0.73 Congress 0.06 CPIb 0.79 0.45 Congress 0.10 CPI 0.55 Congress 
1967 0.54 Congress 0.08 SWAb 0.62 0.41 Congress 0.09 SWA 0.50 Congress 
1971 0.68 Congress 0.05 CPMb 0.73 0.44 Congress 0.07 BJS 0.51 Congress 
1977 0.54 BLD 0.28 Congress 0.82 0.41 BLD 0.35 Congress 0.76 Janata Party (opposition coalition) 
1980 0.67 Congress 0.08 JNP (S)b 0.75 0.43 Congress 0.19 JNP 0.62 Congress 
1984 0.79 Congress 0.06 TDPb 0.85 0.49 Congress 0.07 JNP 0.56 Congress 
1989 0.37 Congress 0.27 JD 0.64 0.40 Congress 0.18 JD 0.58 National Front coalitionc  
1991 0.45 Congress 0.23 BJP 0.68 0.36 Congress 0.20 BJP 0.56 Congress (Minority government) 
1996 0.30 BJP 0.26 Congress 0.56 0.29 Congressa 0.20 BJP 0.49 United Front coalitionc 
1998 0.34 BJP 0.26 Congress 0.60 0.26 Congressa 0.26 BJP 0.52 BJP-led coalitionc 
1999 0.34 BJP 0.21 Congress 0.55 0.28 Congressa 0.24 BJP 0.52 BJP-led coalition (NDA)c  
2004 0.27 Congress 0.25 BJP 0.52 0.27 Congress 0.22 BJP 0.49 Congress-led coalition (UPA)c 
2009 0.38 Congress 0.21 BJP 0.59 0.29 Congress 0.19 BJP 0.48 Congress-led coalition (UPA)c 
2014 0.52 BJP 0.08 Congressb 0.60 0.31 BJP 0.19 Congress 0.50 BJP-led coalition (NDA)  
All Elections 0.53   0.15   0.68 0.38   0.17   0.55   
1952-1984 Average 0.68 
 
0.09 
 
0.77 0.45 
 
0.14 
 
0.58 
 1989-2014 Average 0.37   0.22   0.59 0.31   0.21   0.52   
Source: Author’s calculations based on Election Commission of India data. 
Notes:  (1) Superscript ‘a’ refers to situations where party that received highest share of votes but did not receive highest number of seats 
(2) Superscript ‘b’ refers to situations where election has led to decimation of opposition. 
(3) Superscript ‘c’ refers to coalition governments  
(4) Although 2014 election led to the formation of a coalition government, it was a coalition of choice, since the BJP on its own achieved a majority.
                                                          
10 Description of party names: BLD – Bharatiya Lok Dal, BJP – Bharatiya Janata Party, CPI – Communist Party of India, SWA, CPM – Communist Party of 
India (Marxist), JP(S) – Janata Party (S), TDP – Telugu Desam Party,  JD – Janata Dal, SP – Socialist Party, PSP – Praja Socialist Party, SWA – Swatantra 
Party, BJS – Bharatiya Jan Sangh, JD – Janata Dal. 
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SMPS can also produce highly disproportional results, and the recent national and 
state assembly elections have shown that this is the case in India. In the 2014 
national election (see Table 7), Congress got 19.3% of votes but only 44 (of 543) 
seats, while regional parties ADMK and AITC won 37 and 34 seats respectively with 
vote share of less than 4%, based on a concentrated support base in the states of 
Tamil Nadu and West Bengal respectively. Another anomaly was that the BSP, a 
party that promotes welfare of SCs failed to win any seat despite winning 4.1% of the 
national vote. BJP, on the other hand won 282 (52%) seats with just 31% of votes. 
Sridharan (2014:30) has noted, “In a first-past-the-post system, the BJP’s seat 
majority [achieved in 2014 election] is fragile. It rests on a vote share of just 31 
percent, the lowest such share in Indian history to have produced a seat majority.” 
 
Table 7 2014 national election 
Party  
Vote share % Number of seats 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 31.0 282 
Congress 19.3 44 
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK) 3.3 37 
All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) 3.8 34 
Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 1.7 20 
Shiv Sena (SS) 1.9 18 
Telugu Desam Party (TDP) 2.5 16 
Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) 2.1 4 
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 4.1 0 
All other 30.3 88 
Total 100.0 543 
Source: Election Commission of India data. 
 
A highly disproportional result was seen in the 2015 Delhi state assembly election 
(see Table 8). The Aam Aadmi (common man) party (AAP) won 67 out 70 seats  
(96%) with 54% share of votes, while the BJP only won 3 seats (4%) based on 
32.2% of votes. 
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Table 8 2015 Delhi state election  
Party 
Vote share % Number of seats 
AAP 54.3 67 
BJP 32.2 3 
Others 13.5 0 
Total 100.0 70 
Source: Election Commission of India data. 
 
The 2015 Bihar state assembly election is another example of SMPS producing 
highly disproportional results in a multi-party contest between two competing party 
alliances. The BJP received highest vote share of 24.4% but was only the third 
largest party by seats, after RJD and JD(U), who got much lower share of votes than 
the BJP.11 More recently, the state assembly election in the largest Indian state – 
Uttar Pradesh (UP) in 2017 also produced highly disproportional results. As a 
Parliamentary Standing Committee noted ‘Apprehensions are now being raised that 
in recent years, the FPTP system is not the best suited system, as is evident from 
the recent Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh where results have indicated that a 
party getting 39% of the vote share [BJP] won 312 seats  (77%) and parties getting 
22% [Samajwadi Party] and 21% [Bahujan Samaj Party] of the vote share won only 
47 and 19 seats, respectively,..’ (Scroll, 2017). 
 
MacDonald and Moussavi (2015a: 20) point out that while disproportionality ‘is not 
unusual in FPTP systems, the severity of India’s disproportionately undermines the 
democratic legitimacy of the winning party, whose power is unequal to its support.’ 
Further, given this disproportionality, and the rise of state and regional parties, 
                                                          
11 The contest was between a Grand alliance of Janata Dal (United) or JD(U) and Rashtriya Janata 
Dal (RJD) plus Congress as a minor partner against the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which 
included the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and three smaller parties. This shows that the actual share 
of votes and seats won by parties can be affected by pre-poll seat sharing arrangements.  
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coalition governments are likely to be the outcome of future elections, as is further 
illustrated below. 
 
Table 9 shows (column 2) that before 1989 election, parties other than the top two 
(by seats) won a relatively small number of seats (averaging 119) in Lok Sabha. 
However, in the subsequent elections, this number has saw a dramatic increase, to 
an average of 221. Thus, in order to win a majority, a party now needs to have a lead 
of at least 200 seats over the runner up party – see column 3 of Table 9.12 However, 
this level of lead has only happened once (in 2014) in the last eight elections held 
during the period of 1989-2014, where the average winning margin of the leading 
party over the runner up party was only 79 seats (see column 4 of Table 9). Overall, 
the phenomenon of single party achieving a majority seen in 2014 (which requires a 
lead of over 200 seats over the runner party) is unlikely to repeat in the near future 
even if a single party manages to emerge as a clear winner. A more likely scenario is 
the return of coalition governments, which the SMPS was never intended to produce.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Assuming parties other than the top two win 200 seats, the top two parties are left to compete for 
the balance 343 (543 less 200) seats in the Lok Sabha. In order to achieve, the majority, a party will 
need to win 273 (half of 543 plus 1) seats leaving the runner up party with 73 (343 less 273) seats ie a 
lead of 200 (273 less 73) seats. 
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Table 9 Lead required of a top party to get majority in national elections 
Election year 
Seats won by 
parties other than 
the top two 
Lead required by top 
party  over runner up 
party to secure a 
majority (seats) 
Actual lead over 
runner up party 
(seats) 
Total  
number of 
seats 
1952 109 111 348 489 
1957 96 98 344 494 
1962 104 106 332 494 
1967 193 195 239 520 
1971 141 143 327 518 
1977 93 95 141 542 
1980 135 137 312 529 
1984 80 82 374 514 
1989 189 191 54 529 
1991 169 171 112 521 
1996 242 244 21 543 
1998 220 222 41 543 
1999 247 249 68 543 
2004 260 262 7 543 
2009 221 223 90 543 
2014 217 219 238 543 
Average 1952-1984 119 121 302  
Average 1989 - 2014 221 223 79  
Average 1952 - 2014 170 172 191  
Source: Author’s calculations based on Election Commission of India data. 
 
Moreover, the nature of SMPS has meant that small changes in share of the vote 
often had a dramatic impact upon the number of seats won by a party as Table 10 
illustrates for the Congress. 
 
Table 10 Congress’ vote and seat share 
 
Vote share % Change 
Number of 
Seats 
Seats share 
% Change 
1971 43.7 
 
352 64.8 
 1977 34.5 -21.1% 154 28.4 -56.3%
1980 42.7 23.8% 353 65.0 129.2% 
1984 48.1 12.6% 405 74.6 14.7% 
1989 39.5 -17.9% 197 36.3 -51.4% 
1991 36.5 -7.6% 232 44.5 17.8% 
1996 28.8 -21.1% 140 25.8 -39.7% 
1998 25.8 -10.4% 141 26.0 0.7% 
1999 28.3 9.7% 114 21.0 -19.1% 
2004 26.7 -5.7% 145 26.7 27.2% 
2009 28.6 7.1% 206 37.9 42.1% 
2014 19.3 -32.5% 44 8.1 -78.6% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Election Commission of India data 
 
SMPS in India can deliver single-party government and a reasonably representative 
parliament only if the two main national parties command the support of a large 
proportion of the electorate, and are the top two parties in most constituencies. 
However, the trends suggest that Indian elections are no longer dominated by the 
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two main parties in many parts of the country, and they are also unlikely to receive a 
national share of >30% vote share. Even if a party is able to win a majority of seats 
on the basis of such a low share of vote, this does not arguably reflect a well-
functioning representative democracy.  
 
According to Shugart (2008:21), the existence of local and regional parties make 
Indian situation qualitatively different from many other countries that follow SMPS. 
Similarly, Chhibber and Kollman (2004:206) argue that the main reason for 
fragmentation of the Indian party system after 1989 has resulted from the failure of 
state parties to coordinate, thus causing low level of party aggregation at the national 
level. They go on to say that until mid-1980s, the inability to aggregate for Indian 
parties was due to the failure to aggregate across constituencies as well as across 
states, but thereafter, this happened due to the failure of state-level parties to 
coordinate across state-boundaries. Scholars have also put forward the bipolar 
state-by-state consolidation of non-Congress opposition as an explanation of the 
fragmentation of the Indian party system at the national level (Sridharan, 2014; 
Chhibber and Murali, 2006).13 As Sridharan (2014:51) argues, ‘Duvergerian 
dynamics can lead to two-party or bipolar state party systems due to the 
consolidation of the state-level opposition to the principal party in a principal rival, 
whether a national or regional party, while simultaneously leading to a national multi-
party system because the state level two party systems do not consist of the same 
two parties.’ This explanation corresponds with Sartori’s (1968:282-83) prediction 
that although SMPS is a ‘strong’ electoral system in respect of its ability to shape 
                                                          
13 This bipolar consolidation has been one of multiple bipolarities, for example, Congress-BJP, 
Congress-Left parties, Congress-Regional Party, in different states (Sridharan, 2014:50). 
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voters and parties’ decisions and contain fragmentation, India’s ethnic diversity 
would inhibit the emergence of a two party system.  
 
Thus, the main advantages of SMPS ie it tends to produces stable single-party 
majority governments, provides an effective constituency level representation, and 
aggregate votes across the country, are no longer being achieved in the Indian 
context. Instead, it is likely to produce coalitions, which can be unstable and 
unrepresentative especially under SMPS.14 As Sridharan (2005:348) points out, 
‘[under SMPS] power can shift between opposing coalitions quite dramatically, and 
coalition-making parties have an incentive to try to split the opposing coalition by 
every means, the payoffs being potentially high. Although coalition governments in 
India have been criticised for policy incoherence and delays in decision making, it 
has also been argued that coalitions can have positive economic consequenes since 
they ‘reduce the probability that firms consider economic policy uncertainty an 
obstacle, and increase the probability that firms invest resources in research and 
development’ (Nooruddin, 2010:174). Ruparelia (2015) also highlights that coalition 
governments in India have paradoxically played a key role in India’s governence. 
This paper’s focus is not to evaluate the relative desirability of coalitions versus 
single party governments in India but suggests that given the failiure of SMPS to 
produce expected outcomes (for example single party majority), there needs to be a 
serious reconsideration of continuing with this electoral system.  
 
                                                          
14 BJP’s victory in 2014 national election has been the only exception to this trend since 1989. 
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Some authors (for example Nooruddin and Chhibber, 2008; Uppal, 2009) point out 
that India has very high rates of anti-incumbency, which could be considered as an 
evidence of accountability being enforced via elections (held under SMPS). 
However, high ‘anti-incumbency’ may also indicate that the citizens do not feel 
represented by the incumbent parties (Chhibber and Shastri, 2015).  Overall, there is 
an argument in favour of moving to an alternative electoral system in India, arguably, 
some form of PR. Through appropriate design, one could also guard against extreme 
fragmentation of party system, which a pure form of PR could lead to in the Indian 
situation. 
 
Barriers to reforming electoral system 
 
Despite the problems with the way SMPS has performed in India, electoral system 
reform has not been sufficiently debated or highlighted in either academic studies or 
policy debates. Almost all major national, regional and state parties support SMPS 
because they expect go gain from it either in the national or in the state assembly 
elections.15 For example, the BSP, a party that was ‘wronged’ in the 2014 national 
election due to SMPS (see Table 1), could hope to gain from the same system in the 
state assembly elections in the largest Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, as it did in 
2007, winning 51% of seats on the basis of just 30% of votes.  
 
Table 11 provide a list of seven potential barriers to electoral system reform as 
conceptualised by Rahat and Hazan (2011:479). Overall, as Blais and Shugart 
                                                          
15 Communist Party of India (CPI) is the only major party to favour proportional representation. 
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(2008: 198) point out, major reform to the electoral system is very unlikely and can 
be regarded as a mere ‘accident.’ According to Rahat (2011:524), ‘In the case of 
majoritarian systems (arguably, plurality systems in particular), the few large and 
successful parties have a strong interest in preserving a system that provides them 
with valuable rewards in terms of representation and influence. Even when the 
system does not stand by its promises…politicians do not easily turn to support its 
reform, possibly because they still harbor enough hope to win the grand prize.’ 
 
Table 11 Barriers to electoral system reform 
 Focus Barrier 
   
1. Legal Procedural superiority of the status quo 
2. Cultural Political tradition 
3. Sociological Social structure 
4. Systemic System-level rationale 
5. Seat maximizing Vested rationale 
6. Veto players Coalition politics 
7. Game theory Disagreement over content 
Source: Based on Rahat and Hazan (2011:479) 
 
A similar situation prevails in India, where the interests of large and regional parties 
appear to be the principal explanation of the absence of the reform to the electoral 
system. This proposition is consistent with Colomer (2005), who argues that political 
party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule 
electoral systems. There have been various reports and commissions in India that 
have made recommendations on the subject of electoral reforms, but in most part, 
their focus has been more on the rules and the administrative aspects of the 
elections for example funding of elections, preventing criminals from fighting 
elections rather than the electoral system itself. As MacDonald and Moussavi 
(2015b: 19) point out ‘Questions of political reform in India tend to be kept within the 
parameters of the existing voting system.’ 
 
30 
 
In a report considering changes to the electoral system and other election rules, the 
Law Commission of India (2015) recommended that India may retain the FPTP 
system in all the existing parliamentary constituencies, and then add another 25 per 
cent of seats, the allocation of which among recognised political parties will be 
according to their share in the votes polled, taking the country as a single territorial 
constituency for this purpose.16 Both the major national parties, the Congress and 
the BJP, opposed even this limited and partial move towards a PR system in the 
seminars held to deliberate on these draft proposals of the Law Commission. More 
recently, a Parliamentary Standing Committee (Scroll, 2017) has highlighted 
concerns that the current first-past-the-post system may not be the best in the 
current Indian situation given the extent of disproportionality between votes and 
seats, and sought the views of political parties on the subject, including on 
alternative systems that can be used. The committee has also asked the Election 
Commission to provide a comparative analysis of the first-past-the-post system 
followed in India and the United Kingdom.  
 
The status quo on the subject of electoral system reform in India echoes with 
Lijphart’s (1994, 1999) argument that a cultural/institutional approach is well suited to 
explain the tendency of the Anglo-American democracies toward majoritarian 
electoral systems and the tendency of the continental democracies toward PR 
electoral systems.   
                                                          
16 This hybrid electoral system was first proposed (but not acted upon) in a working paper ‘Reform of 
Electoral Laws’ by the Law Commission of India (1999). 
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Conclusions  
 
SMPS’ appeal lies in its simplicity but it only works well when two parties with 
national appeal share most of the vote, which is not the situation in India. This makes 
it much harder for governments to win an overall majority nationally, which 
undermines the representativeness of governments formed under SMPS. Given the 
increase in the number of parties in India, the elections are likely to produce more 
disproportional results, and therefore more unrepresentative future parliaments. The 
rise in support for parties other than the top two at the constituency level also raises 
questions about the legitimacy of MPs representing their constituents. SMPS not 
only penalises minor parties but also major parties in regions they are weak. 
Similarly, it favours major parties but also minor parties, which are strong in regions. 
Therefore, it can distort patterns of representation across regions, and exaggerate 
contrasts in the political situation across regions. Further, SMPS is poorly suited to 
India given the likelihood of coalition governments, where it is also possible that the 
party with lower vote share may either win more seats than the highest vote getting 
party, or form a coalition with 3rd ranked party. 
 
Overall, one could argue that SMPS is neither representative nor is likely to lead to 
stable single-party governments in India – a situation that could be termed as ‘worst 
of both the worlds’. SMPS’ simplicity and low cost have often been cited as the main 
reasons for its continuance in India. However, as Idea (2005:14) sates: ‘An electoral 
system may be cheap and easy to administer but it may not answer the pressing 
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needs of a country – and when an electoral system is at odds with a country’s needs 
the results can be disastrous.’ Therefore, India should seriously consider reforming 
its electoral system. In respect of policy implications, a pure PR electoral system 
may not be feasible or desirable in the Indian context due to complexity it can 
introduce in the electoral process, and to avoid extreme party fragmentation. Any 
alternative electoral system should balance the need for adequate representation, so 
that citizens feel sufficiently empowered, with other requirements such as stability of 
India’s political system.  
 
This calls for a thorough debate and evaluation of alternative electoral systems and 
their variants by various stakeholders, including political parties and election experts. 
Although there are strong barriers to reforming the Indian electoral system, this issue 
is being looked at by a Parliamentatry Standing Committee in the context of the 
limiations of the SMPS, and needs to be promoted as a prominent policy agenda 
item.  
 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that any change in the electoral system in 
India has to be considered in the context of the broader electoral reforms, including 
funding of political parties to strengthen the trust in the political and electoral 
process, and provide a level playing field for existing parties and potential new 
entrants.  
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